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THE BRUTAL ROAD TO SECURITY FIRST THOUGHTS ON THE FIRST WAR OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The forces
of radical Islam attacked the Looking at the conflict that began on Let that be because they are dead. Let the followers of Osama bin Laden and
all those who support and harbor them build their next mosque in hell. As for the rest of Islam, I hope that the Moslems who
are as repulsed and horrified as the rest of With that established, and disavowing any pretense of
impartiality, it is necessary to look at the coming war rationally. What is in store for the DAMAGE ASSESSMENT With with a critical eye, it becomes readily apparent
that the damage done on September 11 was not critical. This is not to denigrate the property
damage at the Assessing the actual damage in the context of
American national power reveals that the terrorists accomplished little. All the damage to the September 11 accomplished the same mobilization of
American public opinion, a truly dubious achievement for an enemy of the Yet What did the attacks accomplish? I believe nothing good for the
perpetrators. There will be a war in response. The organizations led or coordinated by
Osama bin Laden, starting with his al-Quaida, will be the primary targets;
for the first time in modern history, one of the combatants is an individual
and an international movement, not a nation-state or insurgency. The war will extend to the countries that
harbor and support him, starting with This will be a different war than those fought by I believe that the war that started this week will
operate on three levels. THE CONVENTIONAL WAR Conventional warfare of the sort likely to be
prosecuted against bin Laden and his allies is the most familiar to Americans,
and it typified by the simple principles of destroying enemy military units,
installations, and equipment. But
arguably, it is also the most complex, operating at many levels and through
all arms and services. The quickest response would be through airpower and
cruise missiles. The latter were the
favorite weapons of the Clinton Administration------I believe
excessively-----offering the advantages of long range, accuracy, and not
putting a pilot at risk. Cruise
missiles are suicide planes without the suicide. They are a finite resource however, and carry
insufficient payload for many tasks.
Despite the desires and expectations of casualty-adverse leaders and
populace, it is often necessary to send manned aircraft. Stealth aircraft offer a level of precision
better than cruise missiles, and with very little risk to pilot or
plane. Additionally, stealth missions
typically involve small, cost- and force-effective strike packages, maybe one
or two planes per target. Yet again, the easy solution is frequently not even
close to the best. Sooner or later, it
takes men in visible airplanes, flying in daylight, to engage and destroy
enemy targets that are too large, too general, or too numerous for standoff
missiles, or stealth aircraft carrying limited quantities of munitions. For example, an F-117 stealth fighter is an
ideal weapon for taking out a critical command building, or the nexus of an
air defense network. But it is a
terrible tank buster. For that, F-16’s
and A-10 Warthogs are the weapon of choice, as are AH-64 Apache attack
helicopters. Using these aircraft accepts the certainty of
losses. Even in an environment of
total dominance of airspace, American aircraft will be lost, if by no other
means than accidents and the odd lucky shot from the ground. For a really decisive result, it is essential to
commit ground troops. Kosovo was
decided solely by air power, but that is an exception to an otherwise
ironclad strategic rule. Sooner or
later, victory depends on having men on the ground; ultimately there is no
other way to control territory, or regulate the movements and activities of
the natives. Of course this will be resisted, and there will be
losses. Just as with air forces, ground forces have to be
tailored to the mission. Heavy armor
and mechanized infantry work best on flat plains, light infantry in cities
and mountains, and as the US Marine Corps specializes in amphibious
operations, is best employed on a coastal littoral. Like the Marines, airborne forces work well
in a “breaking and entering” role. However, early media speculation about an invasion of
Naval forces would be extremely useful, but secondary
to attacking a landlocked country such as More likely, a punitive invasion of Seapower fulfills two other vital roles. One is to provide platforms for cruise
missile launches, familiar from Desert Storm. The most crucial asset of the navy is its aircraft
carriers. Each carrier air wing
outclasses most national air forces in the world, so sending one to an area
achieves instant air superiority.
Sending two achieves air dominance.
Three makes the air war a non-contest. Finally, when it comes to amphibious warfare, the
navy and the USMC are symbiotic partners.
Should the war against terrorism extend to CYBER WARFARE Imagine a military officer or analyst, even one of a
visionary nature, watching the nascent air forces of 1914. Could he imagine the air war four years
later? Looking at the frail and slow
reconnaissance planes of the day, could he even imagine that there would be
an air war? The situation is very similar today, only instead of
aerial warfare, the issue is cyber warfare.
In 2001 the Internet is as new as the airplane was in 1914, but has
penetrated and revolutionized economics and culture far more that air travel
at the same age. Worldwide
communications and commerce is cheaper and easier than ever imagined just
twenty years ago. The Internet presents opportunities to all areas of
society to disseminate information, communicate and do business. That is all areas of society, the bad as
well as the good, as demonstrated by web sites set up by pedophiles and
racial supremacists. The opportunities
extend as well to terrorists as well. If an enemy operates in cyberspace, then it is
necessary to pursue him there, just as one with an air force has to be chased
in the air. Thus a war against bin
Laden and al-Quaida calls for a cyber war. As with the embryonic air war of World War I, the
first capability of a cyber offensive against bin Laden would be for
reconnaissance and intelligence.
Reading the other side’s e-mail would be a major step toward
victory. Should bin Laden and company
use encryption safe from American efforts to break it, a dubious proposition
in light of the National Security Administration’s cryptoanalysis
capabilities, traffic analysis could yield valuable intelligence. Every Internet node has a unique numeric Internet
protocol [IP] address, as well as the more familiar word-based Fully
Qualified Domain Name [FQDN]. For
example, Microsoft’s FQDN is, as most ‘Net users know,
www.microsoft.com. Less well-known is
that the corresponding IP address is 207.46.230.220. That’s the simplified version; I will avoid
subnet masks for sake of argument. Even personal computers connected to the Internet
have IP addresses. For a Windows
95/98/Me user, it is easy to find.
Start a DOS command prompt window, and type in “ipconfig.” The command will return the IP address and
subnet mask. Traffic analysis of the terrorist network’s
communications could begin with identifying a computer used by a known
enemy. Then using advanced utilities,
an agency such as the NSA could trace the information packets sent and
received by that computer. It must be
remembered that the Internet protocol on which the system operates is
unrouted, and essentially lets packets find their own best ways to the
recipient; the entire scheme is so fundamentally chaotic that is a wonder
that it works at all. So a terrorist’s
packet-----and there will be many in even the shortest message-----will pass
through multiple servers, nodes, and routers on their way to the recipient. By following these paths, the intelligence agency
could identify the recipient computer, or at the very least the Internet service
provider. Identifying the computer
with which a know terrorist communicates is evidence points a finger of
evidence at its user too.
Subsequently, the intelligence agency can follow the packets
dispatched from it to identify still more machines associated with
terrorists. There are other opportunities as well. If an identified terrorist frequents a web
site, then that information could be turned against him. His next visit could give him more than the
chance to buy music or view Western pornography; he could take a virus or
worm program home with him. The
potential uses of either are impressive.
An illicit program might gather more intelligence from his hard drive
or Internet habits, then send its information home to the Americans through
its own internal e-mail client, thus leaving the infected computer and its
owner none the wiser. Viruses are, as their victims well know,
destructive. Thus in the cyber war
against terrorism, they become more active weapons against the machines of
the enemy. The viruses best known to
the general computing public either activate in each computer as it becomes
infected, or lie in wait for a predetermined date and time. A third possibility of great potential in a
shooting cyber war is a destructive virus that lies dormant, perhaps
camouflaged against the operating system (no doubt sold by Americans), and
proofed against anti-virus software detection software (again American
products). It would activate in all of
its awful glory when triggered by a specific, coded packet sent by an
enemy. Combined with an attack by
conventional military forces or special operations troops, crippled computer
networks can isolate the battlefield and jam communications as airpower and
electronic warfare units did in Desert Storm. The possibilities are endless. So were those of aircraft at the start of
World War I. DIRTY WAR This kind of conflict is sure to make civilized
people squirm. And under civilized
circumstances, it should. Special operations warfare has a somewhat ambiguous
reputation in the In fact, the worst aspects of special operations
warfare are going to be necessary to win the war against terrorism. Call it terror against terror, call it
crime in service of the greater good, call it what you will, it remains a
prerequisite to destroying terrorist networks. This is not a blind assault against wide targets that
have no significant regarding the enemy’s ability to resist and strike
back. Optimally, it is a much more
precise but equally ruthless dagger aimed the individuals and cells of the
terrorist organization. If a terrorist leader can be identified and located,
he should be neutralized. Putting a
smart bomb through his living room window is a possibility that might appeal
to the American people. In World War
II, Americans cheered the assassination of Yamamoto by fighter plane. But over the course of history, these are the
exceptions. Neutralizing an enemy is
more likely to be up close and personal, carried out by a man on the
ground. It might be by sniper rifle,
garrote, or a knife in the back; perhaps a healthy bribe to a trusted
associate can accomplish the goal.
Maybe an enemy could have a fatal car accident, or have his airplane
mysteriously fall out of the sky. The terrorists themselves offer other means that
American and allied special operations units might use. A car bomb, for example, can take out a
headquarters. This points out a couple of reasons for civilized
Americans to turn their eyes from the nastier aspects of special operations
warfare. With some reason, they might
regard this as descending to the level of the terrorists. I counter that in the defense of a
democracy, in this case the end more than justifies the means. Second, there are assassination methods that endanger
noncombatants. Car bombs are an
excellent example; the target building is unlikely to be the only one falling
down, and the terrorists might not be the only ones buried in rubble. The sad fact is that civilized peoples have to accept
that there will be uncivilized secondary results to their own defense. Area bombing is unlikely to make a big comeback in
the cities of In this war, it probably does. In addition, there cannot be strict limits on the
theatre of operations, nor on the strictly-defined terrorist roles of the
targets. Osama bin Laden has wealthy
associates and supporters who are vital to financially supporting his
organizations. They are valid and
worthy targets for neutralization, by any means. Murder will not be the only dirty method in a dirty
war. There will be burglary to gain
intelligence, and kidnapping to gain the same thing through prisoner
interrogation. Extortion, bribery,
robbery, all have their places. Disinformation should not be neglected either. Elmore Leonard once wrote that wonderful
things grow when you sow your seeds of distrust in a garden of assholes. An organization in which that distrust
grows to lethal levels, and sees good terrorists tossed dead in the street by
their own distrustful comrades, eliminates itself without the direct support
of an American bullet. The first central objective of a covert special
operations effort should be intelligence.
Knowing the enemy is always absolutely necessary to winning, and
against an enemy as amorphous and mysterious as bin Laden’s organizations, it
takes on even greater importance. The second is to destroy the networks, one cell or
even one terrorist at a time.
Operation CONCLUSIONS The war against Osama bin Laden and terrorism in
general is one that can be won. Given
the power of the Often warfare can be summed up by three
sentences. If it can be seen, it can
be hit. If it can hit, it can be
killed. So don’t be seen. Sooner or later, bin Laden’s networks will
be seen, on an installment plan, and that will be their doom. In this struggle, the most important variable is
will. The willpower of the terrorists
is already demonstrated in the violent glare of burning jet fuel: The
uncommitted do not incinerate themselves against tall buildings. They have already shown that they want to
win, and will sacrifice everything to do so. Does the Yet national will is nothing to be taken for
granted. It must be sustained through
adversity by effective leadership and the credible presentation of victory. There will be adversity at home. No doubt, the attacks on the I expect that to only harden American resolve. The will to fight can be eroded, however, by military
casualties, if the civilian population feels that there is insufficient
progress toward victory. This was an
important factor in However, this has led to a feeling that war should be
devoid of friendly losses, and can be rendered free of them. Yet victory is inevitable. I will always remember a press conference
during the invasion of But in this new war, there will be coffins with flags
on them. That is not a choice that There is a second potential factor for declining national
will, and that is the nature of the war.
To defeat a foe as determined and ruthless as bin Laden’s terror
network demands equal determination and ruthlessness. As the details of special operations reach
public view, and with a free press no information can be suppressed forever,
elements of the American people will recoil in horror from the actions of
their own government and soldiers.
These elements will include some of the very best and most moral among
us. It is essential that the Moreover, there will be mistakes, and innocents will die
at American hands. News that special
operations soldiers blew up the wrong neighborhood or cut the throat of an
Algerian waiter instead of a pro-Taliban fanatic cannot be allowed to change
strategy. The knowledge that ruthless
is necessary to win has to win out over momentary feelings or moral
revulsion. This temporary suspension of peacetime morality has
to be just that, temporary. Should the
That is one more way for the terrorists to win. But until then, the need to preserve the standards
and norms of peace and civilized behavior, gained with so much difficulty
through history, need to be safeguarded.
That it requires the brutality and violence inimical to them is one
more unpleasant fact of life during wartime. |
